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Abstract. The medical community is producing and manipulating a tremendous
volume of digital data for which computerized archiving, processing and analysis
is needed. Grid infrastructures are promising for dealing with challenges arising in
computerized medicine but the manipulation of medical data on such infrastruc-
tures faces both the problem of interconnecting medical information systems to grid
middlewares and of preserving patients’ privacy in a wide and distributed multi-
user system. These constraints are often limiting the use of grids for manipulating
sensitive medical data.
This paper describes our design of a medical data management system taking
advantage of the advanced gLite data management services, developed in the context
of the EGEE project, to fulfill the stringent needs of the medical community. It
ensures medical data protection through strict data access control, anonymization
and encryption. The multi-level access control provides the flexibility needed for
c© 2007 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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implementing complex medical use-cases. Data anonymization prevents the expo-
sure of most sensitive data to unauthorized users, and data encryption guarantees
data protection even when it is stored at remote sites. Moreover, the developed
prototype provides a grid Storage Resource Manager (SRM) interface to standard
medical DICOM servers thereby enabling transparent access to medical data without
interfering with medical practice.
Keywords: Secure grid storage, gLite middleware, medical data management
1. Context
1.1. Objectives
Many scientific areas benefit from large and distributed storage ca-
pabilities provided by grid infrastructures. On top of physical storage
resources, the EGEE [17] grid data management system eases the ma-
nipulation of large data volumes and provides high level functionality
such as data distribution, replication and optimized access. To build
a data management system that can adapt to the heterogeneous data
storage resources (disk, tapes, silos...), the grid community has adopted
standard interfaces to virtualize the underlying resources. In particular,
gLite [23], the next generation EGEE middleware, has adopted the
Storage Resource Manager (SRM) interface [29] standardized in the
context of the Open Grid Forum [28]. The SRM’s primary concern is
to provide efficient access to large volumes of data. It provides, among
other services, prefetching of data files recorded on secondary storage,
management of storage space and reservation of storage resources. How-
ever, it does not provide any access control nor protection of data which
severely limits its usability for applications manipulating sensitive data.
In this paper, we address the problem of sensitive data management
on the EGEE grid infrastructure and we introduce a data management
service designed to handle medical records on grids. We first moti-
vate our approach through an in-depth requirement analysis of data
management in the medical area (Section 2).
We then introduce a set of gLite services designed to implement se-
cured data storage (Section 3) based on this analysis. They permit fine-
grained access control for application data and metadata using stan-
dard grid credentials and they provide on-the-fly encryption/decryption
capabilities.
We finally propose a software architecture to implement a Medical
Data Management (MDM) service (Section 4). Our proposal provides
access to medical sources for grid services and users while taking into
account the constraints related to clinical practice. In particular pa-
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tient privacy is guaranteed, data location is maintained in acquisition
centers, and the standard clinical data flow is preserved. An implemen-
tation of these services interfaced to the EGEE middleware is finally
demonstrated. Real medical use cases are discussed in Section 5 and
performances are reported in Section 6.
1.2. Related Work
Building a grid interface to medical storage is of high interest for
the medical imaging community and some systems have recently been
reported. The TRENCADIS medical data manager [11] for instance
is a WSRF-compliant middleware designed for sharing, searching and
processing medical images and structured radiological reports. It is one
of the first examples of a fully integrated grid system taking into ac-
count native medical image interfaces, security constraints and medical
ontologies. Compared to the medical data manager presented in this
paper, it is not interfaced to a distributed data management system
and it can therefore not be used transparently by grid applications
interfaced to the data management middleware.
The Storage Resource Broker middleware [8] is also used in the con-
text of the BIRN [9] project for storing and processing large amounts
of distributed medical data. It includes a distributed file management
system and can manipulate metadata associated to files. However, it is
not interfaced to native clinical storage unlike our system.
The security aspects concerning data access control and protection
that are critical for medical systems have been thoroughly studied
on distributed environments such as grids [30]. A consensus seems
to emerge from the community to use shared secret key encryption
algorithms for data protection [35, 34, 36, 38, 10]. They provide a
robust and secure encryption framework. Data access control is a more
controversial point. Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [21] is a flexible
paradigm that can accommodate complex use cases as encountered in
the medical area. Individual users are assigned roles, which represent
collections of authorizations, depending on the tasks they are supposed
to perform. Each user and each permission can be assigned to multiple
roles. Many authorization expression languages (e.g. XACML [39]) and
authorization assertion protocols (e.g. SAML [31]) have been proposed.
In the context of the EGEE grid infrastructure, users are identified
through X509 certificates. Roles are assigned to users through a Virtual
Organization Membership Service (VOMS) [3]. The access control it-
self is implemented in various VOMS-aware data management systems
based on Access Control Lists (ACLs).
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2. Medical Data Management Requirements Analysis
2.1. Clinical Usage of Medical Data
The medical community is routinely using clinical images and asso-
ciated medical data for diagnosis, intervention planning and therapy
follow-up. Medical imagers are producing an increasing number of dig-
ital images for which computerized archiving, processing and analysis
are needed [22, 27]. Indeed, image networks have become a critical
component of the daily clinical practice over the years.
With their emergence, the need for standardized medical data for-
mats and exchange procedures has grown [6]. For this reason, the
Digital Imaging and COmmunication in Medicine standard [15] was
adopted by a large consortium of medical device vendors. Picture Archiv-
ing and Communication Systems (PACS) [25], manipulating DICOM
images and often other medical data in proprietary formats, are pro-
posed by medical device vendors for managing clinical data. PACS are
often proprietary solutions weakly standardized. PACS may be inte-
grated to various degrees with the Hospital Information System (HIS)
that holds administrative information about patients, and with the Ra-
diological Information Systems (RIS) that holds additional information
for the radiology departments. The DICOM standard, PACS, RIS and
HIS have been developed with clinical needs in mind. They are easing
the daily care of the patients and medical administrative procedures.
However, their usage in other areas is very limited. The interface with
computing infrastructures is almost completely lacking in particular. In
addition, current PACS hardly address medical data management needs
beyond clinical centers’ administrative boundaries, while the patient
medical folders are often spread widely over many medical sites that
have been involved in the patient’s healthcare. Many medical image ac-
quisition devices weakly conform to the DICOM standard, thus barely
hiding the heterogeneity of these systems.
2.1.1. DICOM Format
The DICOM standard encompasses, among other things, an image for-
mat and an image communication protocol. A DICOM image usually
contains one slice (a 2D image) acquired using any medical imaging
modality (MRI, CT-scan, PET, SPECT, ultrasound, X-ray... [1]). A
DICOM image may contain a multi-slice data set but this is rarely
encountered. A DICOM image contains both the image data itself and
a set of additional information (or metadata) describing the image, the
patient, the acquisition parameters and the radiology department. DI-
COM metadata are stored in fields. Each field is identified by a unique
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tag defined in the DICOM standard. A given field may be present or
absent depending on the imager that produced the image. The standard
is open and image device manufacturers tend to use their own fields for
various kinds of information. A couple of fields (such as image size) are
mandatory but experience proved that surprises should be expected
when analyzing a DICOM image. The image itself is usually stored as
raw data. Most imaging devices produce one intensity value per image
pixel, coded in a 12 bit format. Other formats may be encountered such
as 16 bit data or lossless JPEG.
2.1.2. DICOM Protocol, Storage, and Security
Most (reasonably modern) medical image acquisition devices are DI-
COM clients. DICOM servers are computers with on-disk and/or tape
back-ends able to store and retrieve DICOM images. The DICOM pro-
tocol defines the communication protocol between DICOM servers and
clients.
The DICOM standard defines in particular a medical data format
(part 10), messages and protocol (part 7) and security management
profiles (part 15). The data format ensures independence from the
DICOM application and media storage. However, it does not define
any storage policy. DICOM servers implement their own policy of data
storage. Data can be sent or retrieved from a DICOM compliant server
using the DICOM protocol and standard messages to push images to
the server or to get them from the server. The DICOM standard does
not address issues of security policies although it mentions that “clearly
adherence to appropriate security policies is necessary for any level
of security”. The standard only provides mechanisms that could be
used to implement security policies with regard to the interchange of
DICOM objects between DICOM-compliant applications. It is up to
applications to agree on the desired level of security.
One should not see a DICOM data set as a set of files. As stated
above, a single DICOM image usually contains only one image slice. In
practice, during a medical examination (a DICOM study), a radiologist
acquires several 2D and 3D images, comprising hundreds or even thou-
sands of slices. A study is divided into one or several series and each
series is composed by a set of slices (that can be stacked to assemble a
volume when they belong to the same 3D image). Each slice is uniquely
identified in its series by a unique SOP instance identifier. Note that
there is often no notion of 3D image encoded in the DICOM format:
a series may contain a set of slices composing several 3D images. The
way a DICOM server stores these data sets on disk is irrelevant just like
the way a database stores its table is usually not known by the users:
the medical user is never exposed to the DICOM storage and does not
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need to know if different files are used for each DICOM slice, series,
study, etc. Metadata is included in DICOM image headers, making it
difficult to search and manipulate. A DICOM server will often extract
the images’ metadata and store it in a database to ease data search.
The DICOM security model is weakened by its flexibility. It provides
technical means of implementing security (relying on existing standards
for data encryption) but it does not enforce any security policy. It is
up to DICOM application to negotiate a level of security agreement.
DICOM files may well be stored and transported unencrypted, expos-
ing sensitive data. The DICOM server security model is based on a
per-application basis: all users having access to some DICOM client
application can access the information that the server exposes to this
specific application. DICOM servers are using random file names with-
out any connection to the patient information and a proprietary data
storage policy. To cope with these data protection limitations, security
is often implemented in hospitals by isolating the image network from
the outside world.
2.1.3. Access to Medical Images
Each image acquisition device is a potential DICOM compliant medical
image source. In a radiology department, one or several DICOM servers
can be set up to centralize data acquired on this site. Medical data are
naturally distributed over the different acquisition sites.
In clinical practice, physicians do not access directly image files.
They identify data by associated metadata such as patient name, ac-
quisition date and radiologist name. The data is transferred mainly for
visualization purposes. The physician quickly scans the slices stack in
the DICOM study and focuses on the slices he or she is interested in.
2.2. Medical Image Analysis
During the previous decades, with the growing availability of digital
medical data, many medical data processing and analysis algorithms
have been developed, enabling computerized medical applications that
benefit of the patient and healthcare practitioners.
Although sharing the same data sources, the medical image analysis
community has different requirements for medical systems than the
healthcare community. Many algorithms are developed for processing
and producing 3D image files: DICOM slices should be extracted from
the DICOM server and assembled in a single volume before being pro-
cessed as a coherent 3D data set. 3D images are exported to disk files
for post-processing and ease of use. Various 3D medical image formats
may be used to stack different DICOM slices into a single image volume
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(the most common being the analyze file format). Images are also often
identified through metadata, although the queries are not necessarily
for nominative data but often related to the acquisition type or body
region. Given the heterogeneity of image servers and 3D file formats,
a common procedure for accessing all medical data sources is often
needed.
2.2.1. Medical Image Processing on Grid Infrastructures
Given the enormous amount of medical data produced inside hospitals
and the cost of medical data computing (especially image analysis algo-
rithms), grids have proved to be very useful infrastructures for a large
variety of medical applications [26]. Grids are providing computing
resources and workload systems that ease application code deployment
and usage. Moreover, grids are providing distributed data management
services that are well suited for handling medical data geographically
spread throughout various medical centers [13, 20, 12, 24, 7]. How-
ever, existing grid middlewares often only deal with data files and do
not provide higher-level services for manipulating medical data. Med-
ical data often has to be manually transferred and transformed from
hospital sources to grid storage before being processed and analyzed.
Such manual interventions are tedious and limit systematic use of grid
infrastructures: some medical applications such as statistical atlas con-
structions or epidemiological studies may require the manipulation of
thousands of images. In these cases, manual intervention is intractable
due to the size of the data sets and the use of grids is only possible if
medical images registration is automatically performed.
2.2.2. Enforcing Medical Data Security
Regulations applicable to medical records in European countries (and
many others) enforce an extremely strict access control on medical data
and patients privacy protection. In clinical practice, this is often ob-
tained by isolating the image network from the external world. Manage-
ment of medical data and deployment of private medical data process-
ing applications on grids cannot be envisaged without demonstrating
a very high level of security compliant with the current standards and
practices of clinical data management.
All medical data should be considered as sensitive to preserve patient
privacy. Nominative medical records are of course the most critical data
and therefore, no binding between nominative data and images should
be possible for non-accredited users. Only physicians participating to
a patient healthcare should have access to the data of this patient.
On a grid, data distribution aggravates the security problems. To
ensure patient privacy, the header of all DICOM images sent by a
GRID172.tex; 7
8 J. Montagnat, A. Frohner, D. Jouvenot, C. Pera et al
DICOM server should be removed, at least partially, to ensure pa-
tients’ anonymity. All images stored out of the source center should be
encrypted to ensure that non-accredited users cannot read the image
content.
2.2.3. Bridging clinical data management systems with the EGEE
grid middleware
The first key to the success of the systematic deployment of medical
image processing algorithms is to provide a data manager that:
− Provides access to medical data sources for computing without
interfering with the clinical practice.
− Ensures transparency so that accessing medical data does not
require any specific user intervention.
− Ensures a high level of data protection to respect patients privacy
and data confidentiality constraints. The data protection scheme
needs to be flexible enough to accommodate complex medical data
manipulation scenarios involving many actors.
The next sessions describe a Medical Data Management system that
we designed to ease medical data access and processing on a grid. It is
compliant with DICOM clinical servers on the one side and interfaced
to the EGEE grid data management system on the other side.
3. Secure Data Storage
3.1. EGEE Data Management System
The EGEE project is currently using the gLite middleware [23] on its
production infrastructure. gLite is based on GLOBUS2, Condor, and
other services developed in the European DataGrid project [16]. Our
Medical Data Manager service (MDM) is strongly interconnected to
gLite.
The gLite middleware provides workload management services for
submitting computing tasks to the grid infrastructure and data man-
agement services for managing distributed files. The data management
is based on a set of Storage Elements which are storage resources
distributed by the various sites participating in the infrastructure (cur-
rently, more than 190 sites distributed all over Europe and beyond).
All storage elements expose a common interface for interacting with
the other middleware services: the Storage Resource Manager interface
(SRM) that is standardized in the context of the Open Grid Forum.
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The SRM is handling local data at the file level. It offers an interface to
create, fetch, pin, or destroy files among other things. It does not imple-
ment data transfer by itself. Additional services such as GridFTP [4] or
gLiteIO [19] are coexisting within storage elements to provide transfer
and data access capabilities.
3.2. Data Distribution and Access Control
In addition to storage resources, the gLite data management system
includes a File Catalog (FiReMAN - File Replication MANager [18])
offering a unique entry point for files distributed on all grid storage
elements. Each file is uniquely identified through a Globally Unique
IDentifier (GUID). The file catalog contains tables associating GUIDs
to file locations. For efficiency and fault tolerance reasons, files may
be replicated on different sites. Thus, each GUID may be associated
to several physical replicas of the same logical file located at different
places and identified by different site-dependent Storage URL (SURL).
To ease the manipulation by users, human readable Logical File Names
(LFN) can be associated to each logical file (each GUID).
The FiReMAN file catalog also associates metadata to files reg-
istered. Some metadata is mandatory (system metadata such as file
checksum). Additional metadata can be defined by the users for ap-
plication needs. In particular, ACLs can be associated to each file.
They identify in a fine-grained manner (per individual user and/or per
group) the access rights of each file. These access rights cover a rich
set of capabilities: they include file list, read and write capabilities,
associated metadata read and write capabilities, and access control
modification capability. Users are individually identified through their
certificate Distinguished Name (DN) that is referred to in ACLs.
Files are accessed using gLiteIO [19]. gLiteIO is a client/server based
data exchange service. The client, installed on any grid client host (user
interface or worker nodes) is the entry point to the data management
system. It receives file access requests and contacts a gLiteIO server.
The gLiteIO server then orchestrates the request. It first contacts the
FiReMAN file catalog to check file access permissions and identifies
the physical server concerned by the request. It then manages the file
transfer. The gLiteIO server, being the only entry point to the data
management system, ensures that all data access is properly authorized.
3.3. Data Encryption
gLiteIO is also the proper place to orchestrate additional services such
as on-the-fly data encryption/decryption. It uses the standard symmet-
ric key algorithm AES cipher available in the OpenSSL distribution for
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that purpose. AES is thoroughly analyzed and recognized robust by
the security community.
The encryption keys are stored in a specific set of servers named
Hydra. Hydra provides controlled access to the encryption key (through
certificate DN-based ACLs, similarly to what is done for files) and
secured communication to the requester. In addition, Hydra exploits
the Shamir secret sharing scheme [37] to improve security and relia-
bility of this service. Shamir’s scheme consists in splitting keys into n
fragments stored in different places. Only m (with m < n) fragments
are needed to reconstruct a complete key. However, owning less than
m key fragments does not give any information on the complete key.
Thus, the system is both resistant to attacks (at least m key stores need
to be compromised for an attacker to be able to reconstruct a key) and
reliable (the disconnection or loss of a limited number of servers does
not prevent the key reconstruction). The Hydra servers hosting the key
shares are completely identical in terms of interface and functionality.
In addition, gLiteIO may be parametrized to enable or disable data
and control flows encryption independently. In our setting, data flow
encryption is deactivated since data files are encrypted for storage and
transported encrypted already. This avoids introducing an extra over-
head with network encryption. Conversely, the control flow is encrypted
so that user requests are not exposed.
3.4. Secure Metadata Manipulation
Patient records, containing personal data, are the most sensitive type
of medical data. For this reason, metadata attached to medical im-
ages should be controlled at least as severely as the image data itself.
Metadata needs to be stored in a database rather than in the image
file headers both to benefit from the database system’s fine-grained
access control over the data and to improve the flexibility and perfor-
mance of queries. The gLite AMGA [5] service is a secured front-end
to traditional databases back-ends (MySQL, Postgres, Oracle). AMGA
implements the gLite standard interface to metadata storage. It en-
ables fine-grained access control through grid certificate with DN-based
ACLs. Per table access control is provided and column access can be
limited through specific table views. AMGA has been thoroughly tested
and demonstrates excellent performance [32].
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Figure 1. Overview of the medical data manager
4. Medical Data Management Service
4.1. Medical Data Manager Architecture
The Medical Data Management service architecture is diagrammed in
Figure 1. On the left, the diagram shows a clinical site: various imagers
in an hospital are pushing the images produced to a DICOM server.
Inside the hospital, clinicians can access the DICOM server content
through DICOM clients. In the center of Figure 1, the MDM internal
logic is represented. On the right side, the grid services interfacing with
the MDM are shown.
All middleware services requiring access to data storage do so through
SRM requests sent to storage elements. To remain compatible with
the rest of the grid infrastructure, our MDM service is based on a
SRM-DICOM interface software. The SRM-DICOM core receives SRM
requests and transforms them into DICOM transactions addressed to
the medical servers. Thus, medical data servers can be shared between
clinicians (using the classical DICOM interface inside hospitals) and
image analysis scientists (using the SRM-DICOM interface to access
the same data bases) without interfering with the clinical practice. An
internal scratch space is used to transform DICOM data into files that
are accessible through data transfer and access services (GridFTP or
gLiteIO).
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A metadata manager is also used to extract DICOM headers infor-
mation and ease data search. In clinical use cases, the client usually
first resolves grid identifiers through a request on the clinical metadata
associated to the images before accessing these files. The AMGA service
is used for ensuring secure storage of these very sensitive data. The
AMGA server holds a relation between each DICOM slice and the
image metadata. For data encryption needs, a Hydra catalog holding
encryption keys associated to files is used.
This specialized SRM is not providing a classical Read/Write in-
terface to a storage element. A classical R/W storage element can
symmetrically receive grid files to be stored or deliver archived files
to the grid on request. In the MDM, the SRM interface only accepts
registration requests coming internally from the hospital as described
in section 4.2. To avoid interfering with the clinical data, external grid
files are not permitted to be registered on the MDM storage space: only
get requests are authorized from the grid side. If classical grid storage
is desired (with write capability), a secondary, standard SRM can be
installed on the same host.
An abstraction layer is also depicted on the diagram. Its role is to
offer a higher level abstraction for accessing 3D images by associat-
ing all DICOM slices corresponding to a single volume. Indeed, most
medical image processing applications are not manipulating 2D images
independently but rather consider complete volumes. The abstraction
layer is associating a single GUID to each volume. On a request for the
volume associated to this GUID, all corresponding DICOM slices (all
slices with the same DICOM study and DICOM series identifiers but
different slice numbers) are transferred from the DICOM server. They
are assembled in a single volume in the order of their slice number on
scratch space using a 3D file format.
4.2. Internal Service Interaction Patterns
To fulfill its role, the MDM service needs to be notified when files
are produced by the imagers and stored into the DICOM server. This
notification triggers a file registration procedure that is depicted in
Figure 2. The DICOM data triggering the operation is first stored
into the hospital DICOM server as usual. The DICOM header is then
analyzed to extract image identifying information. This DICOM ID is
used to build a replica SURL as used by the FiReMAN file catalog to
locate files. The SURL is registered into the File Catalog and a GUID
associated to this data on the grid side. The other metadata extracted
from the DICOM header is stored into the AMGA metadata server.
Finally, an encryption key that is associated to the file and that will
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Figure 2. Triggered action at image creation
be used for data retrieval is generated and stored into the Hydra key
store. The key associated to each file is unique and created at the file
registration time.
Once DICOM data sets have been registered into the MDM, the
server is able to deliver requested data to the grid as depicted in Fig-
ure 3. A client library is used for this purpose. To cover all application
use cases, the MDM client library provides APIs for requesting files
based on their grid identifier (GUID) or on the metadata attached to
the file. In case of a request on the metadata, a database query is first
made to the AMGA server and the list of GUIDs of images matching
the query are returned. The client can then resolve the GUIDs associ-
ated to files matching the query and query the SRM-DICOM server.
The gLiteIO server is the entry point to the storage manager for the
client. It checks the client credential and controls the file access before
resolving the physical file name. An SRM request can then be executed
to retrieve the data from its SURL. SRM get requests are translated
into DICOM get queries by the SRM-DICOM core. Data extracted
from the DICOM server is first written to an internal scratch space.
The image volume assembled is written using a simple 3D image file
format (a human readable header including image size and encoding,
followed by the raw image data). In this transformation the DICOM
headers, which contains patient identifying information, are removed
to preserve anonymity. The files are also encrypted before being sent
out to ensure that no sensitive information is ever transferred or stored
on the grid in a readable format. Files are then transferred through the
gLiteIO service and returned to the client in an encrypted form. The
file is only decrypted in memory of the client host, given that the client
is authorized to access the file encryption keys.
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4.3. MDM Client
On the client side, three levels of interfaces are available to access and
manipulate the data held by the MDM:
1. The MDM is seen from the middleware as any storage resource
exposing a standard SRM interface, the standard data management
client interface can be used to access images provided that their
GUID is known. The files retrieved using this standard interface
are encrypted.
2. The second interface is an extra middleware layer which encom-
passes access to the encryption key and the SRM. Thus images can
be fetched and decrypted locally.
3. The third and last level of interface is the fully MDM aware client
library represented in Figure 3. It provides access to encrypted files
and in-memory decryption of the data on the application side, plus
access to the metadata through the AMGA client interface.
These three access modes correspond to different data access use
cases as illustrated in section 5.2.
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5. Discussion
5.1. Data security
The security model of the MDM relies on several services:
1. file access control,
2. file anonymization,
3. file encryption, and
4. secure access to metadata.
The user is coherently identified through a single X509 certificate and
all services involved in security use the same identification procedure.
The file access control is enforced by the gLiteIO service which accepts
ACLs for fine-grained access control. The Hydra key store and the
AMGA metadata services also accept ACLs. To read the content of an
image, a user needs to be authorized both to access the file and the
encryption key. The access rights to the sensitive metadata associated
with the files are managed independently. Thus, it is possible to grant
access to an encrypted file only (e.g. for replicating a file without ac-
cessing to the content), to the file content (e.g. for processing the data
without revealing the patient identity), or to the full file metadata (e.g.
for medical usage).
5.2. Medical Application Use Cases
Through ACLs, it is possible to implement complex use cases, granting
access rights (for listing, reading, or writing) to patients, physicians,
healthcare practitioners, or researchers needing to process medical data,
independently from each other. A typical scenario of medical image
manipulation on a grid infrastructure from image acquisition to results
storage is as follows:
1. The image of a patient is acquired in an hospital by a radiologist.
The images is archived on the hospital DICOM server. The grid
registration procedure is triggered: a GUID is registered in the
file catalog and an encryption key is registered in the key store.
Theoretically both the patient and the radiologist have access to
this data: the patient might have read access while the radiologist
will have read/write access (he may decide to delete unnecessary
images, or to add image interpretation records). An hospital data
administrator, responsible for archiving the image, should also get
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R/W access to the image and associated metadata. The file cata-
log ACL can be updated with the patient DN (associated to the
read capability), the radiologist DN (R/W capability) and the ad-
ministrator DN (R/W capability) at image registration time. The
key ACL will similarly be updated to enable access to the image
content. Note that the SRM-DICOM server host itself should also
be allowed to access the encryption key (read capability): the key
will be needed for encrypting the file prior to any data transfer.
2. The physician who requested the acquisition will also need access to
the image. The administrator can grant this access right by adding
the physician DN to the data ACL (read capability). The access
right can be provided to a single person or a group (the team of
physicians working in the department). Given that physicians get
full access right (to both data and metadata) of their patient, the
read capability is set to the file ACL, the key ACL and the metadata
ACL.
3. A scientist may need to access the data for a specific study involving
data analysis. On request, the administrator can grant read access
to the data file and encryption key for enabling access from the
grid to this specific user. The patient metadata however do not
need to be exposed to the scientist. If the image acquired is part of
a specific medical protocol for which all images are accessible for
scientific usage, a group authorized to access the images can be set
up and the scientist added to this group.
4. Alternatively, an automatic backup mechanism might trigger files
replication every night to provide recovery (in case of a main server
failure) or high availability on the grid. This server might be au-
thorized to access the file (read capability in the file ACL) but it
does not need to access the file content nor the associated patient
records (key and metadata ACLs are unchanged).
The system architecture described in this paper make such complex use
cases possible while preserving the native medical data storage. Yet, the
access to data for authorized grid users is completely transparent and
does not require more effort than accessing any grid file.
5.3. Medical Metadata Schema
Aminimal metadata schema is defined in the MDM service for all stored
images. It provides basic information on the patient owning the image,
the image properties and acquisition parameters. There are two main
indexes used: a patient ID, for all nominative information associated to
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patients and the image GUID for all information associated to images.
The patient ID is a unique but irreversible field (such as a MD5 sum
on the patient field name). Four main relational tables are used:
− The Patient table, indexed by the patient ID, contains the most
sensitive identifying data (patient name, sex, date of birth, etc).
− The Image table, indexed by the image GUID, contains technical
information about the image (size, encoding, etc). It establishes a
relation with the patient ID.
− The Medical table, indexed by the image GUID, contains addi-
tional information on the acquisition (image modality, acquisition
place and date, radiologists, etc).
− The DICOM table, indexed by the image GUID, contains the
image DICOM identifiers used for querying the DICOM server.
To remain extensible, an additional Protocol table associates image
GUIDs with medical protocol name. Through AMGA, the user can
create as many medical protocols as needed, containing specific infor-
mation related to some particular acquisition (e.g. a temporal protocol
for cardiac acquisitions, etc). AMGA also enables per table access right
control, allowing restricting access to the most sensitive data (e.g. the
Patient table) to the minimum number of users.
In the current prototype, a centralized AMGA server is used to
store all metadata segments extracted from the different images stored
in several DICOM servers. A more realistic deployment scenario in
clinical environment would be to distribute metadata over the different
sites owning the data both for improving reliability (avoiding to create
a single point of failure) and making the system more acceptable to
the end users (sensitive information remain stored inside the hospital).
This evolution will be helped by the federation mode proposed in the
latest AMGA version [33].
5.4. Access Control Policies
The current system only provides a low level interface to control the
access (i.e. manage the ACLs associated) to data and metadata. FiRe-
MAN and AMGA both provides their own ACL management interface
independently. In the future, the MDM should provide a high level
interface to control access rights granted to the system users to the
different part of data and metadata. This system should take into ac-
count the metadata distribution over the different acquisition centers.
Different institutions will want to implement different access control
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policies to their data for different user groups. In particular, physicians
should only get access to metadata of their patients. Defining and
implementing multiple access control policies is a difficult problem that
requires RBAC technologies [21].
6. Deployment and Results
6.1. Testbed
The Medical Data Manager has been deployed on several sites for
testing purposes. Three sites are actually holding data in three DICOM
servers installed at I3S (Sophia Antipolis, France), LAL (Orsay, France)
and CREATIS (Lyon, France). In the current testing phase, the MDM
is not interfaced directly to clinical servers. We have installed a Central
Test Node DICOM server [14] at each site. CTN is a free DICOM server
implemented by the Mallinckrodt Institute of Radiology. It was de-
signed to be used at the Radiological Society of North America annual
meetings to foster cooperative demonstrations by the medical imaging
vendors. The goal is to provide a centralized implementation that facil-
itates DICOM systems interoperability tests. In a clinical environment,
any other DICOM server implementation could be substituted. In ad-
dition to the DICOM servers, these sites have installed the core MDM
services: a SRM-DICOM server and the associated database back-end,
a gLiteIO service, a GridFTP service, and all dependencies in the gLite
middleware. Clients have been deployed on all these three sites.
To complete the installation, an AMGA catalog has also been set
up in CREATIS (Lyon) for holding all sites’ metadata. A FiReMAN
file catalog for indexing files and a Hydra key store for keeping file
encryption keys are deployed at CERN (Geneva, Switzerland).
Given the number of services involved, the installation and configu-
ration procedure is currently complex. It is being simplified to ease the
testbed extension. The MDM service should be deployed in hospitals
where little support is provided for the informatics infrastructure.
The testbed deployed has been used to demonstrate the viability of
the service by registering and retrieving DICOM files across sites. For
testing purposes, DICOM data registrations are triggered manually.
Registered files could be retrieved and used from EGEE grid nodes
transparently, using the standard EGEE data management interface.
In a near future, the MDM service will be deployed on the EGEE
grid infrastructure: the next generation production middleware (gLite
3.0), currently under deployment, encompasses all gLite clients needed
to access this service, thus enabling access to an enlarged scientific
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community. A longer term goal is to test the system in connection with
hospitals by registering real clinical data freshly acquired and registered
on the fly from the hospital imagers. This step involves entering a more
complex clinical protocol with strong guarantee on the data privacy
protection. The security cannot be neglected at any level at this point.
6.2. Performance Analysis
The most critical part of the MDM system in terms of performance
is the image access. Therefore this was analyzed for performance bot-
tlenecks. Two sets of experiments are reported in Figure 4. On the
left column (red curves), the client used is located at I3S, close to the
SRM-DICOM serving the image retrieved. On the right column (green
curves), the client is located at CERN, close to the file catalog and
the key store. In both test cases the same image file was retrieved 69
times from the server. The results are averages of the measured values
to compensate for network and system load variability.
In these tests, a small image (approximately 400kB) was retrieved.
This corresponds to a highly pessimistic case as a large part of the
system overhead is independent from the image size. The total access
time is in the order of 14s in both cases. The table in Figure 4 displays
the average time for each step involved in the process (in seconds) and
the fraction of the total transfer time that this represents. The curves
at the bottom gives a graphical view of the times (left) and overhead
fractions (right).
The steps represented correspond to the services calls depicted in
Figure 3. The total time is measured by the client as the time spent
between the image request and its availability on the client node. It is
divided in three main steps:
1. client - open where the request is authorized, the file location
is resolved via FiReMAN, the DICOM server is queried and the
image volume is assembled and encrypted in scratch space prior to
transfer.
2. client - decryption init where the client fetches the decryption
key and initializes the decryption context. It includes the time spent
by the server to service the demand and the round-trip time to
receive the key.
3. client - read where the client actually reads the blocks of the
encrypted file via remote I/O and decrypts them locally.
The rest of the time spent in the system is summarized in a fourth and
last step labeled ’other’.
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I3S CERN
client - open 7.64 [55.8%] 8.27 [58.8%]
gLiteI/O – access control 0.65 [4.7%] 0.65 [4.6%]
gLiteI/O – resolve SURL 0.69 [5.1%] 0.65 [4.7%]
gLiteI/O – SRM get 5.51 [40.3%] 5.60 [39.8%]
SRM-DICOM — retrieve key 0.73 [5.3%] 0.70 [5.0%]
SRM-DICOM — DICOM transaction 4.79 [35.0%] 4.90 [34.8%]
gLiteI/O – open overhead 0.78 [5.7%] 1.37 [9.7%]
client - decryption init 2.82 [20.6%] 1.35 [9.6%]
client – retrieve key 0.74 [5.4%] 0.40 [2.8%]
client – init overhead 2.08 [15.2%] 0.95 [6.7%]
client - read 0.13 [1.0%] 1.37 [9.7%]
other 3.08 [22.6%] 3.08 [21.9%]
total 13.68 [100.0%] 14.08 [100.0%]
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Figure 4. File access performances. Top: access time from I3S and CERN. Bottom:
Graphical representations of access time (bottom left) and overhead (bottom right).
The access to the DICOM storage depends on the DICOM server
installed and is not under our control. Using the CTN server installed
for our experiments, the DICOM transaction represents approximately
35% of the total time. The remaining 65% are due to the system over-
head (security pay off, network transmission). In case of a larger file,
the relative time spent for DICOM transaction would increase as a
significant fraction of the system overhead is independent from the file
size.
The numbers plotted in Figure 4 show that the main differences
between the clients located at I3S (close to the data) and CERN (close
to the catalogs) are measured for security context initialization and for
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data transfer. Indeed, it took about 20% of the total time to retrieve
the encryption key and to initiate the security context at I3S against
10% at CERN, while it took about 10% of time to transfer data to
CERN against 1% at I3S. The rest of system overheads is similar for
both clients. This proportions would vary with different size files (the
encryption key access time would remain almost constant while the file
transfer time would vary).
It appears that the latency of remote calls, especially to a different
site, is significant (more than 0.5s [5%] each). Thus the number of
these calls should be minimized. The security context initialization, in
particular, causes a noticeable overhead, larger than the data transfer
itself even when considering a remote site. Although remote calls to
security services are mandatory for dealing with medical data, dealing
with full volumes rather than individual slices could drastically reduce
the number of such communications (a single authentication is needed
for retrieving a volume). To go further in that direction, bulk operations
could be envisaged.
7. Conclusion and Perspectives
The Medical Data Manager service presented in this paper is an im-
portant milestone for enabling medical image processing applications
on a grid infrastructure. Its main strengths are:
− To access medical databases without interfering with clinical prac-
tice. Data are kept on clinical sites and transparently transferred
to the grid only when needed.
− To expose standard interfaces to other grid services. The MDM is
fully integrated into the gLite middleware. Hence it benefits from
the data distribution and replication capabilities provided by the
data management system.
− To ensure a high level of security to preserve patients privacy.
The MDM prototype was successfully deployed and tested in a
controlled environment. The next step is to interface to medical im-
agers inside hospitals. It will require to simplify the installation and
configuration procedures as much as possible.
The core MDM development is not finished yet and additional func-
tionality will be included to enrich the service. In particular, metadata
is expected to be distributed in the different clinical sites where data is
acquired rather than being centralized as it is the case in our testbed.
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This configuration will be more acceptable to the clinical data ad-
ministrators who want to keep control on the hospital data. It will
require deploying several AMGA servers on different sites and exposing
a centralized query service able to retrieve data from these different
servers.
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